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Duz PRacss or LA v IN PRocLuuRP. - There are two classes of cases
which may arise under the "due process" provisions of the 5th and 14th
Amendments of the United States Constitution, so far as rules of procedure
are concerned. One embraces cases of new remedial processes which may
be criticized as too radical. The other consists of cases of old processes
which may be criticized as obsolete and out of harmony with prevailing con-
ceptions of justice. Due process may thus be said to fill the wide space be-
tween those innovations which carry us so far away from established meth-
ods as to remove the safeguards which are deemed essential to the protection
of person and property, and those ancient remedies which enlightened modem
opinion condemns as barbarous.
Most of the cases which have come before the courts belong to the first
class, and in dealing with them the problem has been how to determine the
point at which departure from settled usage becomes so great as to under-
mine what are considered the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
Certainly the procedure in England at the time of the emigration cannot be
"fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight-jacket only to be
unloosed by constitutional amendment". Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78, 1o.
But the cases falling into the second class are much less numerous. It
has been said that a process is due process of law if it can show the sanction
of settled usage both in England and this country. Hurtado v. California,
io U. S. 516. It would seem reasonable, however, to assume that the settled
usage might become so remote in point of time and so out of harmony with
contemporary ideas, as to cease to enjoy the quality of due process.
This argument was made in Miedneich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236,
against the ancient rule that a sheriff's return cannot be falsified in the action
in which it is made, and that a party not served with process, who is thereby
deprived of his day in court, may nevertheless lose his property by judicial
sale on a default judgment based on a false return, without being allowed
to show that he was never in fact served. It appeared, however, that this
rule of the ancient common law was still currently adhered to in a number
of American states, and the Supreme Court of the United States felt itself
unable to say that the rule was inconsistent with the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment.
A more striking case of the same type has just come before the Supreme
Court. In Own;bey v. John Pierpont Morgan, et al., U. S. Sup. Ct., April
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ii, i921, No. 99, an action was commenced by attachment in Delaware against
a non-resident. The defendant attempted to appear, but was refused the
right to do so unless he put in special bail to the amount of the value of the
property held under the attachment. This was the statutory rule in Dela-
ware, and the defendant, who was unable to put in the special bail, attacked
the rule as operating to deprive him of property without due process of law.
It appeared that this harsh rule was derived from the Custom of London
in foreign attachment, and had been brought over to America by the colonists,
and that in Delaware it could show statutory continuity down to the present
time. The court cites a number of cases from other seaboard states where
the Custom of London also obtained a foothold, but an investigation of the
statutory history of the rule in those states seems to indicate that in every
one of them the rule long since succumbed to the progress of enlightened
civilization and passed over the Styx into the shadowy land of legal tradition
where the ghosts of ancient laws wander restlessly forever. Sodom was
thought worthy of being saved if but ten righteous men could be found
there, and it is possible that our constitution should be equally charitable to-
ward any medieval custom which could show the endorsement of even a
single modern jurisdiction. But the court took a rather cheerless view of
the purpose of the constitution, saying that, "However desirable it is that
the old forms of procedure be improved with the progress of time, it cannot
rightly be said that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes a universal and
self-executing remedy. Its function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries
no mandate for particular measures of reform." This sounds like the ex-
clusion from the purview of the constitution of practically all cases of out-
grown processes, and would probably justify the current use of trial by
battle. But the court may not have intended to take such broad ground
against rising standards of justice. Its decision is probably correct, but its
re~sons seem to accord too high a degree of respectability to the lingering
relics of a ruder age. E.R. S.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
